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1. Historical  perspective 
 
Knowledge has been at the heart of economic 
growth and the gradual rise in levels of social 
well-being since time immemorial 1. The ability to 
invent and innovate, that is to create new 
knowledge and new ideas that are then embodied 
in products, processes and organizations, has 
always served to fuel development. And there 
have always been organizations and institutions 
capable of creating and disseminating knowledge: 
from the medieval guilds through to the large 
business corporations of the early twentieth 
century, from the Cistercian abbeys to the royal 
academies of science that began to emerge in the 
seventeenth century.  ￿Knowledge-based 
economy￿, however, is a recently coined term. As 
such, its use is meant to signify a change form the 
economies of earlier periods, more a 
"sea-change" than a sharp discontinuity.  This 
transformation can be analysed at a number of 
different levels. 
 
1.1 The acceleration of knowledge 
production 
 
The crux of the issue lies in the accelerating 
(and unprecedented) speed at which 
knowledge is created, accumulated and, most 
probably, depreciates in terms of economic 
relevance and value. This trend has reflected, 
inter alia, an intensified pace of scientific and 
technological progress. It has a host of 
ramifications and gives rise to many new 
challenges (see sections 5 and 6). But the 
discontinuity is not equally pronounced in 
every sector (see section 5.2). A new kind of 
organization is spearheading the 
phenomenon: knowledge-based 
communities, i.e. networks of individuals 
striving, first and foremost, to produce and 
circulate new knowledge and working for 
different, even rival, organizations. One sign 
that a knowledge-based economy is 
developing can be seen when such 
individuals penetrate conventional 
organizations to which their continuing 
attachment to an ￿external￿ 
knowledge-based community represents a 
valuable asset. As members of these 
communities develop their collective 
expertise, they become agents of change for 
the economy as a whole (see section 3). 
 
1.2  The rise  of intangible capital at 
macroeconomic level 
 
Economic historians point out that nowadays 
disparities in the productivity and growth of 
different countries have far less to do with 
their abundance (or lack) of natural resources 
than with the capacity to improve the quality 
of human capital and factors of production: 
in other words, to create new knowledge and 
ideas and incorporate them in equipment and 
people. 
 
A related characteristic of economic growth, 
that became increasingly evident from the 
early twentieth century onwards, is the 
growing relative importance of intangible 
capital in total productive wealth, and the 
rising relative share of GDP attributable to 
intangible capital (Abramovitz and David, 
1996; Abramovitz and David, 2000). 
Intangible capital largely falls into two main 
categories: on the one hand, investment 
geared to the production and dissemination 
of knowledge (i.e. in training, education, 
R&D, information and coordination); on the 
other, investment geared to sustaining the 
physical state of human capital (health 
expenditure). In the United States, the 
current value of the stock of intangible capital 
(devoted to knowledge creation and human 
capital) began to outweigh that of tangible 
capital (physical infrastructure and 
equipment, inventories, natural resources) at 
the end of the 1960s. 
 
Recent work by OECD has helped produce 
stable categories of knowledge-related 
investment for given countries or sectors. 
Taking the simple yet highly restrictive 
measure of investment in research and 
development, public education and software, 
one can see that annual investment rates have 
grown strongly since the 1980s (at an average -2-
annual rate of 3% in the OECD countries). 
Investment structures, however, differ from 
one country to the next: Scandinavian 
countries, for instance, spend more on public 
education, while industrial investment 
(private-sector R&D, software and 
information technology equipment) tops the 
list in the United States (OECD, 1999). 
 
This basic underlying trend must not be 
allowed to obscure the growing importance 
of science and technology-related activities. 
Knowledge-based economies are not, of 
course, restricted to the realm of high 
technology, but science and technology do 
tend to be central to the new sectors giving 
momentum to the upward growth of the 
economy as a whole over the past few 
decades (pharmaceuticals and scientific 
instrumentation, information and 
communication technologies, aeronautics, 
new materials). 
 
These developments are reflected in an 
ever-increasing proliferation of jobs in the 
production, processing and transfer of 
knowledge and information. This trend is not 
just confined to the high-technology and 
information and communication service 
sectors as it has gradually spread across the 
entire economy since first coming to light as 
early as in the 1970s. Society as a whole, then, 
is shifting to knowledge-intensive activities. 
 
1.3 Innovation is becoming the 
dominant activity, its sources ever-more 
varied 
 
Another reflection of the aforementioned 
￿gear change￿ is the growing speed and 
intensity of innovation. There are two main 
ways in which breakthroughs come about: 
first, through formal research and 
development work off-line (i.e. ￿isolated￿ and 
￿sheltered￿ from the regular production of 
goods and services); second, through learning 
online, where individuals learn by doing and, 
as a rule, can assess what they learn and hone 
their practices for what follows next. This can 
be an extremely potent form of knowledge 
production in many professions. 
 
Significantly increasing investment in 
innovation (not least in R&D) has sent the 
numbers of innovations appearing soaring, as 
evidenced not only by the volume of patents 
requested and approved (OECD, 1999), but 
also by the proliferation of new varieties of 
goods and services that has marked the trend 
toward ￿mass customization￿ (see David, 
2000a). At the same time, practice-based 
learning environments appear to be 
broadening out from situations where Fordist 
divisions of labour in offices and factories 
reduced the individual￿s scope of activity and, 
hence, opportunity to learn. This, in turn, is 
fostering ever-greater possibilities for 
knowledge creation. 
 
Meanwhile, the ￿need to innovate￿ is 
growing stronger as innovation comes closer 
to being the sole means to survive and 
prosper in highly competitive and globalized 
economies. It is not easy to distinguish 
between absolute novelties (￿under the sun￿) 
and innovations that are new only to the 
companies that adopt them, or more 
complex adaptations of existing products or 
ideas to a new market. The fact remains that 
companies and society in general are 
spending more time and energy on producing 
and adjusting to change.
2 
 
Formal research may remain the cornerstone of 
knowledge production in many sectors (for the 
simple reason that it provides a more or less 
sheltered domain in which to carry out 
experiments that would not otherwise be possible 
in real life). But the knowledge production system 
is becoming more widely distributed across a host 
of new places and actors. More and more 
￿innovators￿ tend to be appearing in 
unexpected situations: users as the source of 
innovation (von Hippel, 1988a), ￿lay people￿ 
involved in the production of scientific 
knowledge within such realms as health and 
the environment.
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1.4  The revolution in instruments of 
knowledge 
 
The fourth level at which the ￿soft 
discontinuity￿ can be analysed concerns the 
major technological revolution that is taking 
place as we enter the digital age. It is a 
revolution of crucial importance in that it -3-
basically involves technologies for knowledge 
and information production and 
dissemination. These new technologies, 
which first emerged in the 1950s and then 
really took off with the advent of the 
Internet, have breathtaking potential. They 
enable remote access to information and the 
means of acquiring knowledge. In addition to 
transmitting written texts and other 
digitizable items (music, pictures), they also 
allow users to access and work upon 
knowledge systems from a distance (e.g. 
remote experimentation), to take 
distance-learning courses within the 
framework of interactive teacher-student 
relations (tele-education) and to have 
unbelievable quantities of information ￿ a 
sort of universal library ￿ available on their 
desktops. 
 
Information technologies can affect 
knowledge creation in a number of different 
ways. For a start, the mere fact that one has 
the capacity to create such a wealth of 
information is truly revolutionary. Imagine 
how hard it was for people to obtain 
instruments of knowledge before the modern 
age. Apart from a handful of marvellous 
centres of intellectual life such as the ancient 
library of Alexandria, such facilities were few 
and far between. The great eleventh century 
thinker, Gerbert d￿Aurillac, had a library 
containing no more than 20 books (although 
that was quite a lot in those days). Even in the 
somewhat less perilous times of a couple of 
decades ago, imagine what a laborious task it 
was for students to produce a round-up of 
the ￿state of the art￿ in a particular subject or 
discipline, and the uphill struggle involved in 
remaining abreast of the latest findings in 
their study field. 
 
Development here has been a long, 
drawn-out process punctuated by the 
invention of the codex and the book (which 
took over from scrolls), the perfecting of 
paper, the book￿s transformation into a 
knowledge tool (indexes, tables, footnotes 
and endnotes), improvements in the 
productivity of copy-making (from the 
￿industrial￿ organisation of the scriptorium 
through to the invention of the printing 
press), the proliferation of modern libraries 
and, finally, the advent of increasingly 
high-performance access and 
communication networks. Do new 
technologies signal an end to that evolution? 
Clearly not, for an enormous amount of 
progress remains to be made in such areas as 
information search systems.  But this might 
almost be said to be the culmination of  what 
the French medievalist Georges Duby once 
called the ￿relentless pursuit of instruments 
of knowledge￿ that has preoccupied 
humankind since the dark ages. 
 
Second, information technologies enhance 
creative interaction not only among scholars 
and scientists but, equally, among product 
designers, suppliers and the end customers. 
The creation of virtual objects that can be 
modified ad infinitum and are instantly 
accessible to one and all, serves to facilitate 
collective work and learning. In that respect, 
the new possibilities that computers have 
opened up for numerical simulation 
represent another significant departure from 
prior experience. 
 
Third, the new technologies enable the 
exploration and analysis of the contents of 
gigantic databases, which is in itself a potent 
means of knowledge enhancement (in 
natural, human and social sciences and 
management alike). Research stimulated by 
such possibilities has a strong influence in 
some areas of managerial work. 
 
Finally, the above three ways in which 
information technologies affect knowledge 
creation can be combined in the 
development of large-scale decentralized 
systems for data gathering and calculation 
and the sharing of findings. Such extensive 
systems characterize the research being done 
these days in the fields of astronomy, 
oceanography and so on. 
 
1.5 Five years of the ￿new economy￿ -- 
viewed in historical perspective 
 
Now that the emergence of knowledge-based 
economies has been put into historical 
perspective, the new economy debate can 
only be viewed with a degree of amusement.  
It has focused on the possible need for a -4-
radical reform of macro-economics because 
the dominant tenets of that field appeared to 
have been surprised by the American 
economy￿s performance during the last 
half-decade of an entire millennium. Overall, 
this debate will mainly be remembered for 
the clash between the ultra-optimists and 
their relatively crude economic thinking, and 
the sceptical macroeconomists who, despite 
their usual rigour and prudence, have an 
extremely partial and truncated view of the 
impacts of new technologies (Gordon, 2000). 
Yet is not what the United States and, more 
recently, European and other Western 
countries have been experiencing just part of 
an accelerating transition to the 
knowledge-based economy, a process that 
began quite some time ago but which only 
started gathering momentum fairly recently 
owing to the slow maturation of the new, 
general-purpose technology of digital 
information processors and 
computer-mediated telecommunications 
(David, 1990, 2000, 2001a). 
 
2.  Exploring the black box of 
￿knowledge￿ 
 
Before going on to describe the workings of a 
knowledge-based economy, it is important to 
have a clear idea of exactly what it is that is 
passing through the electronic pipelines: 
knowledge, information or data? Something 
of each, actually. It all depends on the nature 
of the relationship between the senders and 
recipients. 
 
2.1  Knowledge and information 
 
A basic distinction should be drawn between 
knowledge and information.
4  Knowledge ￿ in 
whatever field ￿ empowers its possessors 
with the capacity for intellectual or physical 
action. So what we mean by knowledge is 
fundamentally a matter of cognitive 
capability. Information, on the other hand, 
takes the shape of structured and formatted 
data that remain passive and inert until used 
by those with the knowledge needed to 
interpret and process them. The full meaning 
of this distinction becomes clear when one 
looks into the conditions governing the 
reproduction of knowledge and information. 
While the cost of replicating information 
amounts to no more than the price of making 
copies (i.e. next to nothing thanks to modern 
technology), reproducing knowledge is a far 
more expensive process because some, 
indeed many, cognitive capabilities are not 
easy to articulate explicitly or to transfer to 
others. There are elements that therefore 
remain "tacit": ￿we know more than we can 
say￿ (Polanyi, 1967).
5  Knowledge 
reproduction has therefore long hinged on 
the ￿master-apprentice￿ system (where a 
young person￿s capacity is moulded by 
watching, listening and imitating) or on 
interpersonal transactions among members 
of the same profession or community of 
practice. These means of reproducing 
knowledge may remain at the heart of many 
professions and traditions, but they can easily 
fail to operate when social ties unravel, when 
contact is broken between older and younger 
generations and when professional 
communities lose their capacity to act in 
stabilizing, preserving and transmitting 
knowledge. In such cases, reproduction 
grinds to a halt and the knowledge in 
question is in imminent danger of being lost 
and forgotten. 
 
2.2  Codification of tacit knowledge 
 
On the other hand, knowledge may, be 
codified: so articulated and clarified that it 
can be expressed in a particular language and 
recorded on a particular medium. 
Codification involves the exteriorization of 
memory (Favereau, 1998). It hinges on a 
range of increasingly complex actions such as 
using a natural language to write a cooking 
recipe, applying industrial design techniques 
to draft a scale drawing of a piece of 
machinery, creating an expert system from 
the formalized rules of inference underlying 
the sequence of stages geared to problems 
and so on. As such, knowledge is detached 
from the individual and the memory and 
communication capacity created is made 
independent of human beings (as long as the 
medium upon which the knowledge is stored 
is safeguarded and the language in which it is 
expressed is remembered). With the 
emergence of codification, ￿the problem of 
memory ceases to dominate intellectual life￿ -5-
(Goody, 1977). Learning programmes are 
then produced that partially replace the 
person who holds and teaches knowledge. 
Goody (1977) notes that a written recipe can 
partially fill up the empty space created by the 
absence of the grandmother. 
 
 ￿Partially￿ is the key word here because for 
codification amounts to the process of 
reducing human knowledge to information, 
and in the course of such transformations 
some things almost  certainly something will 
be altered, and, quite likely, other meanings 
will be lost. What is expressed and recorded, 
then, is not complete knowledge. It is a 
learning programme that helps to stabilize 
and reproduce knowledge. When a young 
technician receives a user￿s manual, he or she 
is not directly given knowledge on ￿how to 
run the machine￿. That said, the manual is 
helpful and will serve to reduce the costs of 
knowledge reproduction. 
 
In many cases, when technicians have 
￿learned to learn￿ and are dealing with a 
more or less standard machine, knowledge 
reproduction becomes almost instantaneous 
and assumes characteristics close to those of 
information reproduction. In more complex 
cases, however, the codified knowledge, 
while certainly useful, will only provide partial 
assistance. Knowledge reproduction will then 
occur through training, practice and 
simulation techniques (aircraft pilots, 
surgeons). 
 
There is, it must be stressed, a second and, in 
our view, crucial function of codification. 
Codification consists in translating 
knowledge into symbolic representations so 
that it can be stored on a particular medium. 
This creates new cognitive potentialities that 
remain inconceivable so long as the 
knowledge is attached to individual human 
beings and, hence, only heard (when spoken) 
or seen (when put into practice) through 
interaction with those carriers. Inscribing 
(through writing, graphics, modelling, 
virtuality) makes it possible to examine and 
arrange knowledge in different ways and to 
isolate, classify and combine different 
components. This leads to the creation of 
new knowledge objects such as lists, tables, 
formulae, etc. These are fundamentally 
important in that they open up new cognitive 
possibilities (classification, taxonomy, tree 
networks, simulation) that can provide a 
framework for the rapid production of new 
knowledge (Goody, 1977). But they are only 
possible when people consider the matter of 
recording and, hence, the symbolic 
representation of their cognitive states. 
Advances in information technology-based 
recording methods are crucial here, for they 
allow representations of knowledge to 
progress from the so-called ￿pre-literate￿ 
stage (gestures and words) to the literate 
(writing and drawing) and then post-literate 
stages (modelling structured interactions). 
 
Codification thus plays a central role in the 
knowledge economy because it serves to 
further memorization, communication and 
learning, and forms a sound basis for the 
creation of new knowledge objects. 
 
3.  Knowledge-based communities as 
agents of economic change 
 
Knowledge-based activities emerge when 
people, supported by information and 
communication technologies, interact in 
concerted efforts to co-produce (i.e. create 
and exchange) new knowledge. Typically, this 
involves three main elements: a significant 
number of a community￿s members combine 
to produce and reproduce new knowledge 
(diffuse sources of innovation); the 
community creates a ￿public￿ space for 
exchanging and circulating the knowledge
6; 
new information and communication 
technologies are intensively used to codify 
and transmit the new knowledge. 
 
3.1  Rachid and Rachel 
 
The following fable brings out the 
significance of the last of the above three 
components (the use of new technologies for 
knowledge codification and transmission). 
Let us compare the experiences of two 
scholars: Rachid, a seventeenth century 
astronomer from the beautiful town of Fez, 
and Rachel, an imaginary young engineering 
postdoctoral student working in a Stanford -6-
University laboratory in the late twentieth 
century. 
 
Rachid invented a new telescope and wanted 
to transmit the details of his discovery to 
colleagues in Cordoba, Padua and Salamanca. 
This was an arduous task because this kind of 
knowledge had not yet been codified at the 
time and he had to copy all of his plans and 
notes by hand. Rachid then entrusted his 
precious documents to the northbound 
caravans, in the hope that they would one day 
be delivered to his colleagues. There was little 
certainty of that happening. More 
problematic still are the situations in which 
knowledge is basically memorized and passed 
on by word of mouth (accompanied by 
somewhat incomplete papers intended to 
assist recall), because the circle of effective 
users typically remains confined to direct, 
personal contacts. Moreover, as that circle is 
widened, there is an increasing risk of the 
content becoming distorted in the course of 
oral transmission and successive copying. 
Only recurring communications 
back-and-forth among each of the pairs 
participating in such a network of 
transmission would operate to limit the 
propagation of "copying errors".  The 
likelihood of that occurring, however, 
diminishes as the number of links in the 
human chain of communications increases. 
 
Hence, there are physical limitations 
preventing expansion of the community of 
people who can harness new knowledge, and 
possibly further improve upon Rachid’s 
design. Knowledge flows have existed 
throughout history, but, as a rule, they have 
been few and far between and relatively 
feeble. As we have seen, the principal 
exceptions were permitted by the 
maintenance of dense interpersonal 
communication networks, such as those that 
linked the Cistercian abbeys of medieval 
Europe. This has checked the development 
of cumulative momentum in the growth of 
the stock of reliable knowledge.  To be sure, 
before the seventeenth century in the West, 
prevailing attitudes obstructed the 
widespread disclosure of "Nature’s secrets" 
were perhaps more important than 
limitations of community technology in 
impeding effective cooperation in the pursuit 
of knowledge (see David, 1998, 2001c). 
 
As for Rachel, let us say that she invented a 
small robot, working out the engineering 
details with the help of a 
computer-aided-design (CAD) program. 
Wishing to inform her community, she 
quickly produced the relevant documents and 
plans with the help of graphic design 
software. The files were then copied and 
despatched as email attachments to a list of 
selected addresses. Within seconds, they were 
received by dozens of laboratories 
throughout the world and hundreds of 
researchers could begin reproducing the 
knowledge and sending back their comments, 
criticisms and suggestions. Knowledge 
codification and transmission costs here were 
very low (i.e. Rachel￿s marginal costs of 
codifying and transmitting the knowledge in 
question, given the fixed infrastructure, and 
her training costs). So too were those of its 
reproduction. Indeed, this is the case when 
the invention itself remains within the 
framework of knowledge with which the 
community￿s members are familiar: the 
people receiving the file have ￿learned to 
learn￿ this kind of knowledge and the 
attached document provides a detailed 
learning programme. 
 
A knowledge-intensive community is one 
wherein a large proportion of members is 
involved in the production and reproduction 
of knowledge. Therefore, it is likely that such 
a community constitutes a public (or 
semi-public) space where codification and 
dissemination costs have been radically 
reduced by the pre-existence of commonly 
employed concepts and terminological 
conventions; the existence of the latter 
further facilitates information and 
communication technologies to enhance the 
circulation of new knowledge. 
 
3.2 Knowledge-intensive communities 
and their ￿virtues￿ 
 
Rachid and Rachel are scientists, and, in the 
modern world scientific communities may be 
regarded as the specialized social 
organizations most thoroughly committed to -7-
the knowledge-based production activity ￿ 
if only because they are engaged in "the 
production of reliable knowledge by means 
of reliable knowledge". A majority of their 
members are, therefore motivated by the 
reward systems and social ethos reinforced by 
scientific community-specific institutions to 
disclose and share that knowledge (Dasgupta 
and David, 1994). Historically speaking, these 
scientific research communities, being 
concerned with the capture, storage, analysis, 
and integration of experimental and 
observational data, have been pioneers in the 
development and use of new information 
technologies. 
 
Communities of programmers engaged in 
creating and improving so-called "open 
source" software resemble "open science" 
research communities in many of these 
aspects, and, like them, are not able to extract 
economic revenues directly from the sale of 
the new knowledge and information-goods 
that they create. They must find collateral, or 
ancillary sources of support  (see  Steinmuller 
(in this issue), Lakhani and von Hippel (2000) 
on ￿open source￿ communities). 
 
Some business-to-business communities, 
however, also have modes of operation that 
share some of the same features.  For 
example, general research consortia are 
club-like organisations, devoted to some 
collective technological goals which the 
members regard as jointly beneficial, and best 
pursued in a cooperative manner. 
 
Doctors represent another instance of 
communities, in this case communities of   
professional specialization, that are 
undergoing a  transition towards the higher 
frequency of peer-to-peer information 
transactions that is a key characteristic of the 
knowledge-based economy and, more 
generally, of  the knowledge-society,  Many 
doctors now document their new clinical 
knowledge and make it available to others 
through easily accessible electronic databases. 
Other practitioners then can draw on or add 
to that pool of information, thus enhancing 
the advance of evidence-based medicine. 
 
Curiously enough, however, teachers at the 
elementary and secondary level, on the other 
hand, do not fit the template of the modern 
knowledge-based communities, even though 
they make intensive use of knowledge. There 
may be a massive amount of innovation 
going on as individual instructors strive to 
find solutions to their teaching problems, 
but, perhaps because those problems involve 
working with "unstandardized materials", i.e. 
their students, relatively few of those 
pedagogical innovations are passed on to, 
and shared by the rest of the community 
(Hargreaves, 2000). 
 
Communities characterized by all three of the 
aforementioned components (extensive 
knowledge creation and reproduction, 
mechanisms for exchanging and 
disseminating the resulting knowledge and an 
intensive use of new information 
technologies) tend to be fundamentally 
geared to knowledge-driven production. As 
such, they display a certain number of 
￿virtues￿: 
•  knowledge enhancement is 
boosted by a host of 
opportunities for recombination, 
transposition and synergy; 
•  a large share of the knowledge 
base is codified, which leads to 
greater storage and 
communication capacity and 
makes it possible to develop new 
cognitive approaches; 
•  quality control is guaranteed 
because members can each 
reproduce, test and criticize new 
knowledge; 
•  static efficiency is, as a rule, 
reinforced, meaning that because 
everyone has access to the 
knowledge produced, the same 
items will not end up being 
reinvented (while new 
knowledge can benefit from 
strong collective focus, 
collaborative experimentation 
and enhancement efforts); 
•  learning productivity is made 
greater by the fact that an 
individual can ￿learn to learn￿ -8-
through reproducing the 
knowledge of others; 
•  opportunities have emerged for 
the spatial reorganization of 
activities and the creation of 
virtual communities as it has 
become less expensive to move 
knowledge than people. 
 
Is there an optimum size of 
knowledge-intensive community? From an 
empirical point of view, sizes will be seen to 
vary greatly between the global community of 
high energy particle physicists (comprising 
several thousand members) and a tiny 
community of aeronautical engineers 
working on a particular problem in airfoil 
design, or consortia among teams of 
molecular geneticists seeking to identify and 
locate the gene for a heritable form of breast 
cancer. The potential for producing and 
reproducing knowledge will become greater 
as a community expands; but then so will the 
costs of data search, the risk of congestion 
and anonymity amongst members, which 
can, in turn, represent a source of acute 
problems of trust. Optimum size may be said 
to vary as data search and filtering 
technologies improve and new trust-building 
mechanisms are perfected (see below, section 
5.4). But it also depends on the nature of 
exchanges (geared merely to accessing a 
knowledge base or stemming from intensive 
interactivity within the framework of a 
research project). 
 
3.3  Knowledge communities as agents 
of economic change 
 
Most knowledge communities cut across the 
boundaries of conventional organizations 
(businesses, research centres, public and 
government agencies, etc.) and members of 
the former are at the same time employed by 
the latter. So, the development of the 
knowledge economy has seen, inter alia, 
conventional organizations infiltrated by 
individuals whose continuing attachment to 
an ￿external￿ knowledge community makes 
them all the more valuable to the 
organizations that harbour them as regular 
employees. Examples of this phenomenon 
from the world of business include engineers 
belonging to different firms who exchange 
knowledge and "trade secrets￿ within the 
framework of a network operating by the 
rules of reciprocity (von Hippel, 1988b); 
scientists employed by large pharmaceutical 
companies who are encouraged to publish in 
scientific journals and retain strong links with 
their university-based scientific counterparts 
(Cockburn et al., 1998); cooperative projects 
among users of the same technology (e.g. 
software) who expect to make use of the 
improved technology in the work as 
employees of different, and even rival 
companies (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2000). 
By penetrating conventional organizations, 
these communities become agents of change 
for their industry, and, indeed, for the 
economy as a whole. 
 
In every such situation, however, there is 
always a danger of problems arising due to 
conflicts between private-sector companies 
that regard new knowledge as their exclusive 
property, and knowledge communities to 
whom sharing knowledge is their raison d￿Œtre. 
The knowledge community is a fragile 
structure in that it is based on informal rules 
(reciprocity, disclosure). So it can rapidly 
disintegrate when their members lose the 
ability or the dedication to follow those rules, 
and, instead seek to further their individual 
interests through non-cooperative action in 
the realm of  markets. 
 
4.  A few unanswered questions 
 
The foregoing formulation of a definition 
and analytical approach to the notion of 
"knowledge-based activities" still leaves a 
good many quite basic questions to be 
answered concerning the workings of the 
evolving knowledge-based economy. 
 
4.1 Does the knowledge-based 
economy demand specific skills and 
abilities? 
 
Are ￿new skills and abilities￿ required for 
integration into today’s knowledge economy? 
If so, what are they? Are they really as new as 
some might like to make out? Beyond the 
levels of proficiency needed for the use of 
information technologies, there do appear to -9-
be a number of set requirements: teamwork, 
communication and learning skills. But these 
sorts of ￿soft skills￿ can hardly be described 
as new. Indeed, though sidelined during the 
age of Fordism, they have always, throughout 
history, been crucial to the development and 
well-being of individuals in the world of 
work. 
 
Many experts underscore the importance of 
generic learning abilities (learning to learn, 
knowing what we do not know, being aware 
of the main forms of heuristic bias that can 
distort the power of reasoning).
7 It is better to 
have a firm command of such abilities, they 
say, than to be able to master a specific 
repertoire of technical skills. The need to 
keep up with incessant change is essentially 
what drives employees to develop new kinds 
of skills and abilities. These go beyond the 
constant updating of technical knowledge, 
for they also pertain to the capacity to 
understand and anticipate change.
8 
 
4.2  Returning market work to the 
home? 
 
Given how efficiently knowledge can travel 
when reduced to information, and the fact 
that the costs involved in moving people are 
still so high (and even rising with the growth 
in size of urban areas), one may well have 
grounds for believing that increasing 
numbers of people are going to be working at 
home now that the technological capacity is 
available for knowledge-sharing, remote 
access and teamwork, and organizing and 
coordinating tasks over wide areas. Does this 
herald the end of geography or, at the very 
least, of the influence of geographical 
distance over how activities are organized? 
Clearly, the influence of geographical 
distance is waning. Many different kinds of 
transactions now take place within the 
framework of location strategies 
￿unconstrained by distance￿. And many 
customers have not the slightest idea where 
(geographically speaking) their transaction is 
being processed. 
 
But whether or not this marks a trend of 
work returning to the home is rather less 
clear. Historical perspectives are still too 
sketchy to ascertain whether there really is 
￿some tendency for the pendulum to start 
swinging back￿ (Mokyr, 2000), thus ending 
the centuries-long development of a factory 
system that has compelled workers in 
industry then services, trade and education to 
commute to work.
9 The costs involved, 
though impossible to quantify, have certainly 
been huge. Cairncross (1997) suggests that in 
￿half a century￿s time it may well seem 
extraordinary that millions of people once 
trooped from one building (their home) to 
another (their office) each morning, only to 
reverse the procedure each evening  ￿ 
Commuting wastes time and building 
capacity. One building ￿ the home ￿ stands 
empty all day; another ￿ the office ￿ stands 
empty all night. All this might strike our 
grandchildren as bizarre￿. Mokyr (2000) 
makes a sound case for considering some 
development of a home-production 
economy in light of the fact that it costs less 
to transport knowledge than people. Such 
developments, however, are likely to 
continue being impeded by all manner of 
apathy for some time to come. Which leaves 
much to be done as regards the redesigning 
of space in line with the opportunities offered 
by the knowledge economy. 
 
Furthermore, many activities cannot be 
coordinated by virtual means alone.
10 The 
emulation and spontaneity generated by 
physical presence and social groupings often 
remain crucial. Likewise, direct face-to-face 
exchanges are important when they enable 
other forms of sensory perception to be 
stimulated apart from those used within the 
framework of electronic interaction. For 
many individuals, it is the personal 
interactions of the workplace, the stimulus 
provided by a change in environment from 
one’s domestic habitat, that makes work 
enjoyable; futuristic scenarios depicting the 
joys of tele-working from one’s home-office 
often are expressions of solitary authors, 
impatient with the intrusions of the world 
and people about them. 
 
On the whole, individuals now have far more 
room to choose between working at home 
(and cutting commuting costs) and travelling 
to the collective workplace (to benefit from -1 0-
the advantages of interacting with a ￿real￿ 
group), but the question remains as to the 
extent that this option will prove attractive. 
 
5 The  challenges 
 
The profound transformations that we have 
been examining are neither automatic and 
inevitable, nor will the results of the changes 
underway necessarily turn out to be 
universally beneficial.  It is therefore 
important now to consider six major issues 
that our societies need to address in order to 
ensure a fuller realisation of the potentials of 
the knowledge economy. 
 
 
5.1  Access to information and to 
knowledge bases 
 
Our community-based approach has the 
virtue of showing that access to the 
knowledge economy is still highly limited and 
that there are great disparities between 
countries and social groups. 
 
Clearly, the frequently distinction drawn 
between  ￿information society ￿haves￿ and 
￿have-nots￿￿ is overly simplified, as is the 
notion that there has emerged a ￿digital 
divide￿ that can and should be overcome by 
providing universal technical access to the 
Internet. Telecommunications access 
undoubtedly is a relevant consideration, 
given that more than two-thirds of the 
world￿s people today do not have the 
advantage of simple telephone connections, 
let alone computers and links to Internet 
service providers. Yet, the more difficult and 
in a sense more fundamental problems are 
not simply those of providing greater 
technological access to information streams. 
Rather, they involve furnishing people with 
the cognitive capacities and intellectual 
frameworks than enable humans to interpret, 
select and utilise information in ways that 
augment their capabilities to control and 
enhance the material circumstances and 
qualities of their existence. 
 
One may say, then, that one of the respects in 
which ￿knowledge is power￿ reflects the fact 
that knowledge access is essential for 
meaningful information access. The 
relationship between human knowledge and 
information is reflexive, however; the 
formation of an individual￿s knowledge 
beyond the acquisition of understandings 
derived from personal experience is 
enormously abetted by receiving 
interpretable (decodable) information that 
encapsulates the shared learning of others. 
To put the point plainly, the nature of the 
content that is readily available for 
distribution is critically important. Access to 
channels of communication that are 
transmitting information of certain, 
capability-building kinds can play an 
instrumental part in accelerating the 
acquisition of the human cognitive skills that 
will impart enhanced relevance and greater 
value (utility) to the other information 
streams which also may by carried through 
those same channels.  
 
Returning to the simpler issue of providing 
universal telecommunications access, for the 
moment, it is important to acknowledge how 
large a gap exists between reality and the 
evocative idea that because we all share the 
planet, humankind belong to ￿a global 
village￿ (UNDP, 1999). On the one hand, 
information infrastructure in some countries 
is so poor that ￿planet Internet￿ would 
appear to belong to altogether another galaxy. 
As many as 133 developing countries have 
asked the United Nations to maintain radio 
stations and other traditional media as a 
means of disseminating information, because 
use of the Internet alone would exclude many 
people from access to information flows. 
 
Participation in knowledge-based economies, 
on the other hand, stems from 
intangible-capital investments in educational 
effort on the part of teachers and students, 
efforts directed to forming the basic skills and 
abilities (reading and writing) that text-based 
cultures require. Claims that a technological 
leap would enable a society to bypass certain 
stages in the development of knowledge 
infrastructures should be taken with a pinch 
of salt. Could e-books ever compensate for 
the lack of paper text-books for elementary 
school instruction? Can a civilization be rid 
itself of the disabilities of illiteracy through -1 1-
the widespead application of audio-visual 
media? Hardly. Post-literacy does not mean a 
return to illiteracy.  It may be enjoyable and in 
some instances highly efficient for people to 
exchange information imparted by pictures, 
but, until a richer and standardised pictorial 
vocabulary is created, increasing reliance 
upon non-textual communications eventually 
will restrict the cognitive progress produced 
by more complex (codified) representations 
of knowledge (section 2.2). 
 
That said, our community-based approach 
does provide a good many pointers and 
grounds for hope. Some scientific 
communities in the developing world are 
close to meeting the conditions to be able to 
participate more fully in the discovery and 
creation of new knowledge, rather than 
remaining trapped behind the frontiers of 
research and therefore unable to direct its 
advance toward the solutions of problems 
that have pressing relevance in their own 
societies. In their case, then, the problem 
really is one of becoming extensively 
equipped with high-quality information 
infrastructures of a sort that the researchers 
(many of whom trained abroad) already are 
capable of using.  
 
Some of the problems of access to the 
large-scale and very costly research facilities 
in the natural sciences ￿ of a sort that only the 
economically developed countries can afford, 
often through cooperative undertakings -- 
now may be overcome by means of 
high-speed telecommunications.
11 The latter 
permit remote access to observational 
instruments and mass data-transport for 
subsequent analysis, and the cost of 
providing the necessary bandwidth typically 
is much lower than that of constructing the 
facilities, even if the technical capability to 
build these existed in the developing country. 
 
 While ￿moving the data￿ is thus part of the 
solution, the international movement of 
scientific personnel gives rise to some 
significant problems for the developing 
countries. These are the losses of research 
and future teaching talent that may occur 
so-called scientific and engineering brain 
drains.￿ As long as the viability of the 
developed countries￿ systems continues rely 
upon talented students abroad as the means 
of overcoming shortages of young people 
seeking advanced scientific training, they will 
pursue selectively liberal immigration policies 
that developing-country scientists find hard 
to resist; and communities will not be formed 
in their home land.
12 
 
The development of dynamic scientific 
communities does, of course, hinge on a 
number of other factors.
13 But all the means 
are in place to bring an end to the ￿relentless 
pursuit of instruments of knowledge￿ for 
scientists working in developing countries. 
Other professional communities ￿ doctors, 
teachers, urban planners and architects ￿ also 
represent focal points where the key 
components of the knowledge-based 
community should gradually be deployed. 
Finally, Arora, et al. (this issue) stress the 
virtues of the technology markets as 
development tools whenever they help to 
drastically reduce the cost of access to 
technological know-how. 
 
5.2  Uneven development of knowledge 
from one sector to the next 
 
Unequal access to pertinent knowledge bases 
may well constitute an important condition 
underlying perceptible differences in the 
success with which different areas of 
endeavor are pursued within the same 
society, and the pace at which productivity 
advances in different sectors of the economy 
during a given historical epoch. In the 
nineteenth century, for example, even in the 
more developed high income economies, the 
improvement of agricultural productivity 
lagged behind that in industry in good part 
because the relevant knowledge base in plant 
and animal biology and soil chemistry was 
comparatively narrower, and less dynamic, 
than was the case in mechanics and inorganic 
chemistry.  That situation was largely 
transformed by the second half of the 
twentieth century, as is testified to by the 
successes of "the Green Revolution" brought 
by new plant varieties, and the acceleration of 
agricultural productivity growth rates in the 
advanced economies to parity with those in 
their manufacturing sectors. -1 2-
 
Today it remains astonishing to observe the 
contrast between fields of economic activity 
where improvements in practice are closely 
reflecting rapid advances in human 
knowledge -- such as is the case for 
information technologies, transportation, 
and certain areas of medical care (surgery and 
drug therapy) -- and other areas where the 
state of knowledge appears to be far more 
constraining. Do people today know how to 
teach, plan cities, avoid the ravages of war, or 
perform string quartets any better than they 
did in the nineteenth century? Probably not 
to any noticeable extent. The fact is that 
knowledge is not being developed to the 
same degree in every sector. 
 
In some measure this is attributable to the 
failure of mechanisms that would otherwise 
properly gauge the intensity of each of the 
items forming the array of society’s wants, in 
the way that markets gauge the intensity of 
demands for the array of privately consumed 
commodities; thereby generating price signals 
which stimulate profit-motivated efforts to 
satisfy those wants.  The combatants in a 
military conflict generate demands for 
weapons, to which arms merchants hasten to 
respond; the civilian populations that, as a 
result are likely to be "collaterally damaged" 
are not so readily able to generate ￿a market 
for inoperable weapons.￿ Analogously, albeit 
less dramatically, the same point is made by 
observing that pharmaceutical companies 
respond to the large market demand for new 
drugs to treat ulcers and hypertension, rather 
than investing R&D on improving the 
availability of drugs for the victims of malaria 
and other tropical diseases that ravage poor 
countries. 
 
Nevertheless, differences in the ability to 
focus demand do not provide a complete   
explanation. It is equally important to 
acknowledge that the uneven state of the 
accessible knowledge may arise from the fact 
that the capabilities for supply to respond to 
perceived wants are not everywhere the same. 
The sectors where knowledge creation has 
occurred at an extremely rapid pace are those 
in which the interrelationships between 
science and technology are especially close 
and intense. These are the sectors capable of 
carrying out controlled experiments and 
thoroughly testing results while maintaining 
constant liaison and feedback between the 
various stages of experimentation and 
application. Besides, technological advances 
generate better scientific instruments, which 
in turn help to improve experimentation 
methods. The interlinkages between 
￿science-enlightened technology￿ and 
￿technology-equipped science￿ provide the 
basis for the rapid development of 
knowledge in some areas. It is a model that 
involves heavy investment in off-line 
experimental research activities and 
large-scale knowledge codification so that 
interactions between science and technology 
can be sustained by a standardized and 
systematic knowledge system. 
 
Many sectors visibly fail to meet these 
conditions for rapid progress. In the field of 
education, for instance, science does not 
much ￿enlighten￿ the art of teaching. It can 
hardly be said to play a very strong role as a 
factor enabling the direct production of 
systematic knowledge which translates into 
￿programmes that work￿ in the classroom 
and lecture theatre. Education is not a field 
that lends itself well to experimentation: what 
works with a pilot school may prove hard to 
replicate elsewhere. Part of the problem is 
that experimental approaches are impossible 
to describe in precise enough detail to be sure 
that they really are being replicated (Nelson, 
2000). Education also constitutes a realm 
where knowledge is little codified. There is no 
equivalent in teaching to the kinds of 
reference books and documents used by 
doctors, lawyers or engineers. So young 
teachers begin their careers without the help 
of those ￿sets of codified instructions￿. As a 
rule, the profession of teaching is not 
organised to keep practitioners informed of 
alternative approaches and solutions tested 
by others; instead they proceed by intuition 
and imitation of recognised practices in the 
repertoire of "master teachers". There are 
only weakly developed mechanisms whereby 
communities of educational practitioners 
collectively can capture and benefit from the 
individual discoveries made by their 
members. Opportunities for regular -1 3-
knowledge exchanges between educational 
researchers and teachers are few and far 
between (Hargreaves, 2000). 
 
A good number of sectors not benefiting 
from the ￿science-enlightened technology￿ 
model thus find themselves confronted by 
the question of how they can enhance 
knowledge at similar speeds to the 
science-based sectors. Instead of attempting 
to export that model to sectors where it is 
ill-suited, one would be better off devising a 
role for science in contexts where the bulk of 
innovation stems from practical experience; a 
role geared not just to supplying ￿tools that 
work￿, but to developing a methodology for 
documenting, assessing and promoting 
practice-based innovations. 
 
The success of the ￿science-enlightened 
technology￿ model has obscured the fact that 
there are other ways in which science can 
interrelate with technology; and that 
developing them can help to improve the 
advancement of knowledge in some sectors. 
 
5.3  To protect intellectual property 
rights or the public domain of knowledge 
? 
The past two decades have witnessed 
growing efforts to assert and enforce 
intellectual property rights over scientific and 
technological knowledge through the use of 
patents, copyrights, and other, more novel 
forms of legal protection. (The latter include 
the special legislation introduced in the US in 
1980 to extend copyright protection to the 
"mask work" for photo-lithographic 
reproduction of very large microelectronic 
circuits on silicon  wafer, and the European 
Union’s protection of databases by new 
national statutes implementing an EC 
Directive issued in 1996.) These 
developments have coincided with two other 
trends that, similarly, have tended to expand 
the sphere of private control over access to 
knowledge, at the expense of the public 
knowledge domain.   
One trend has been the rising tide of 
patenting activity by universities, especially in 
the areas of bio-technology, pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices and software. This 
movement started in the US, where it 
received impetus under the 1980 Bayh-Dole 
Act (1980) that permitted patent applications 
to be filed for discoveries and inventions 
issuing from research projects that were 
funded by the federal government, but is has 
since spread internationally, being reinforced 
by the efforts in other countries to foster 
closer research collaboration between 
universities and public research institutes, on 
the one hand, and private industry on the 
other. The other trend has seen a concerted 
effort by all parties to secure copyright 
protection for the electronic reproduction 
and distribution of information, in part to 
exploit the opportunities created by 
electronic publishing, and in part to protect 
existing copyright assets from the 
competition that would be posed by very 
cheap reproduction of information in digital 
form over electronic networks. 
 
The sudden upsurge of enthusiasm for 
expanding the private property rights over 
information has given rise to a rather 
paradoxical situation (Foray, 1999). The 
technological conditions (codification and 
low-cost transmission) may be right for 
individuals to be able to enjoy instant and 
unfettered access to new knowledge, but a 
proliferation of intellectual property rights 
inhibits access to such information in areas 
(basic research in general, the life sciences, 
software) where new knowledge had 
remained largely in the public domain. Thus, 
it may be said that individuals and firms today 
are striving to create artificial scarcities ￿ by 
achieving legally sanctioned monopolies of 
the use of information -- in fields where 
abundance naturally prevails, thus giving rise 
to an enormous amount of waste. 
To understand the economics of intellectual 
property, and thus the irony of this situation,  
one has to start from the observation that 
knowledge is not like any other kind of good, 
and certainly does not resemble conventional 
commodities of the sort that are widely 
traded in markets.  Intellectual property 
cannot be placed on an equal footing with 
physical property, for the simple reason that 
knowledge and information possess a specific 
characteristic that economists refer to as 
￿non-rival in use￿: the same idea and its -1 4-
expression may be used repeatedly, and 
concurrently by many people, without being 
thereby ￿depleted.￿ This contrasts with the 
properties of ordinary ￿commodities￿ that 
are consumed: if Marie eats the last slice of 
cake in the kitchen, that piece cannot also be 
consumed by Camille; whereas, both girls 
may read the same novel either 
simultaneously or sequentially, and in so 
doing they will not have rendered the story 
any the less available for others to enjoy. 
 
 The allocation of property rights in the case 
of information-goods does not attempt to 
confer a right of exclusive possession, as do 
property laws governing tangible goods such 
as land.  Indeed, to claim a right of possession 
one must be able to describe the thing that is 
owned, but no sooner do you describe your 
idea to another person than their mind comes 
into (non-exclusive) possession of it; only by 
keeping the information secret can you 
possess it exclusively. 
What the creation and assigning intellectual 
property rights does, then is to convey a 
monopoly right to the beneficial economic 
exploitation of an idea (in the case of patent 
rights) or of a particular expression of an idea 
(in the case of copyright) that has been 
disclosed, rather than being kept secret.  This 
device allows the organisation of market 
exchanges of  ￿exploitation rights,￿ which, by 
assigning pecuniary value to commercially 
exploitable ideas, creates economic incentives 
for people to go on creating new ones, as well 
as finding new applications for old ones. By 
tending to allocate these rights to those who 
are prepared to pay the most for them, the 
workings of intellectual property markets also 
tends to prevent ideas from remaining in the 
exclusive (secret) possession of discoverers 
and inventors who might be quite 
uninterested in seeing their creations used to 
satisfy the wants and needs of other members 
of society. 
 
Another potential economic problem that is 
addressed by instituting a system of 
intellectual property rights is the threat of 
unfair competition -- particularly the 
misappropriation of the benefits of someone 
else￿s expenditure of effort ￿ which might 
otherwise destroy the provision of 
information-goods as a commercially viable 
activity. The nub of the problem here is that 
the cost of making a particular information 
good available to a second, third, or 
thousandth user are not significantly greater 
than those of making it available to the first 
one.  When ThØo listens to a piece of music, 
modern reproduction and transmission 
technologies will permit Quentin, Manon and 
millions of others to listen to the same piece 
without generating significant additional 
costs. The costs of the first  copy of a 
compact disk (CD) are very great, compared 
to the cost of ￿burning￿ a second, third or 
millionth copy of that CD. Ever since the 
Gutenberg revolution, the technical advances 
that have lowered the costs of reproducing 
￿encoded￿ material (text, images, sounds) 
also has permitted ￿pirates￿ to appropriate 
the contents of the first copy without bearing 
the expense of its development. Unchecked, 
this form of unfair condition could render 
unprofitable the investment entailed in 
obtaining that critical first copy.  
Producers of ideas, texts, and other creative 
works (including graphic images and music) 
are subject to economic constraints, even 
when they do not invariably respond to 
variation in the incentives offered by the 
market.   If they had no rights enabling them 
to derive income from the publication of 
their works, they might create less, and quite 
possibly be compelled to spend their time 
doing something entirely different but more 
lucrative.  So, there is an important economic 
rationale for establishing intellectual property 
rights. A strong case also can be made for 
protecting such rights by the grant of patents 
and copyrights, especially as that way of 
providing market incentives for certain kinds 
of creative effort leaves the valuation of the 
intellectual production to be determined ex 
post, by the willingness of users to pay; it 
thereby avoids having society try to place a 
value on the creative work ex ante ￿ as would 
be required under alternative incentive 
schemes, such as offering prospective 
authors and inventors prizes, or awarding 
individual procurement contracts for 
specified works. -1 5-
  
But, the solution of establishing a monopoly 
right to exploit that ￿first copy￿ (the idea 
protected by the patent or the text protected 
by copyright), alas, turns out not to be a 
perfect one.  The monopolist will raise the 
price of every copy above the negligible costs 
of its reproduction, and, as a result, there will 
be some potential users of the information 
good who will be excluded from enjoying it.  
The latter represents a waste of resources, 
referred to by economists as the 
￿dead-weight burden of monopoly￿: some 
people￿s desires will remain unsatisfied even 
though they could have been fulfilled at 
virtually no additional cost.  Economists as a 
rule abhor ￿waste,￿ or ￿economic 
inefficiency,￿ but they believe in and rather 
like the power of market incentives. Not 
surprisingly, then, the subject of intellectual 
property policies has proved vexatious for 
the economics profession, as it presents 
numerous situations in which the effort to 
limit unfair competition and preserve 
incentives for innovation demonstrably 
results in a socially inefficient allocation of 
resources. 
 
There is not much empirical evidence as to 
how altering the legal conditions and terms of 
intellectual property rights translates into 
change in the overall strength of economic 
incentives for the producers, or about the 
effectiveness of bigger incentives in eliciting 
creative results; nor is it a straightforward 
matter to determine the way in which holders 
of a particular form of intellectual property 
right would choose to exploit it, and the 
consequent magnitude of the resultant social 
losses in economic welfare (￿the dead-weight 
burden￿). Without reliable quantitative 
evidence of that kind, obviously, it is hard to 
decide in which direction to alter the 
prevailing policy regime in order to move 
towards the notional optimum for any 
particular market. 
 
The difficulties of arriving at ￿scientific 
closure￿ on such matters, combined with 
conflicts of economic interests over the 
distribution of the benefits of new 
knowledge, quite understandably, have 
sustained a long history of intense debate in 
this area.  In each era of history new 
developments affecting the generation, or the 
distribution of knowledge, give rise to a 
revival of these fundamental questions in 
new guises. Today, the ￿hot issues￿ arise 
from questions concerning the desirability of 
(a) curtailing patent monopolists￿ rights by 
letting governments impose compulsory 
licensing of the local manufacture of certain 
pharmaceutical products, or of some medical 
devices; (b) providing those engaged in 
non-commercial scientific research and 
teaching with automatic ￿fair use￿ 
exemptions from the force of intellectual law; 
(c) permitting purchasers of copyright 
protected CD￿s to freely share music tracks 
with others by means of peer-to-peer 
distribution over the Internet. 
  
There is no easy general solution to this class 
of economic problems, and useful answers to 
the basic questions raised (are new rights that 
would better address the new circumstances 
required, and, if so, what form should they 
take?) will vary from one case, area or 
situation to the next. Most economic and 
legal analysis favours protecting broad classes 
of intellectual works, rather than very specific 
forms that are more likely to be rendered 
economically obsolete. But having flexible 
legal concepts which are meant to be applied 
in novel situations creates added 
uncertainties for innovators.  There is likely 
to be a protracted period of waiting, and 
struggling to have the courts settle upon an 
interpretation of the law that is sufficiently 
predictable in its specific applications to 
provide a reliable guide for commercial 
decision-making. 
 
Another general principle that finds widely 
expressed approval is that of harmonising 
intellectual property rights institutions 
internationally, so that arbitrary, inherited 
legal differences among national entities do 
not interpose barriers to the utilisation of the 
global knowledge base in science and 
technology.  The catch in this, however, is 
that harmonisation rarely is a neutral -1 6-
procedure. Representatives of polities usually 
are loathe to cede property rights which their 
constituents already possess, and, 
consequently, programs of  ￿harmonisation￿ 
turn out to impart an unwarranted global bias 
towards expanding the range of property 
rights that will be recognised and raising the 
strength of the protections afforded. 
 
A more tenable broad policy position on this 
contested terrain may be derived from the 
recognition that the generation of further 
knowledge is among the major important 
uses of new knowledge, and, at the same 
time, there are enormous uncertainties 
surrounding the nature and timing of the 
subsequent advances that will stem from any 
particular breakthough. This is especially true 
of fields where new discoveries and 
inventions tend more readily to recombine in 
a multiplicity of ways that generate further 
novelties.  A reasonably clear policy 
implication follows from this, and from the 
additional observation that although we will 
seldom be able to predict the details and 
future social value attaching the sequelae of a 
specific advance in knowledge, it is far more 
certain that there will be a greater flow of 
entailed discoveries if the knowledge upon 
which they rest remains more accessible and 
widely distributed. Therefore, rather than 
concentrating on raising the inducements to 
make ￿hard-to-predict￿ fundamental 
breakthroughs, it will be better to design 
intellectual property regimes in ways that 
permit non-collusive pooling and 
cross-licensing. As a practical matter, this 
consideration generally would call for raising 
the novelty requirements for patents, 
awarding protection for narrower claims, 
requiring renewals with increasing fees, and 
other, related measures. All of these steps 
would encourage entry into the process of 
generating further knowledge by utilising the 
breakthroughs that have occurred and been 
adequately disclosed (see David and Foray, 
1996). 
 
The import of this is to strictly limit the scope 
of grants of monopoly rights over research 
tools and techniques, curtailing the freedom 
of the rights-holders levy whatever ￿tax￿ they 
wished upon others who might use such 
inventions and discoveries in order to 
generate still further additions to the 
knowledge base. Collective knowledge 
enhancement is thwarted when discoveries 
cannot be freely commented upon, tested by 
replication, elaborated upon and recombined 
by others. Putting this in other words, 
intellectual property regimes designed to 
make it easier for many to ￿see farther by 
standing on the shoulders of giants￿ would 
appear likely to be more fruitful than a 
strategy which render those shoulders less 
easily mounted by others, in the hope that 
this would stimulate the growth of more, and 
taller ￿giants.￿ 
The extension of monopoly rights over the 
application of particular research tools in the 
life sciences -- techniques such as PCR 
(polymerase chain reaction) and monoclonal 
antibodies, new bioinformatic databases and 
search engines, as well as generic information 
about the structure of genetic material and 
the way that these govern the production of 
proteins ￿ is coming to be seen as especially 
problematic.  The issuing of such patents may 
indeed be responsible for stimulating more 
commercially oriented R&D investment by 
pharmaceutical companies, and others who 
look forward to selling them access to new 
information. Yet, intellectual property 
protection in this sphere is likely to impose 
heavy dynamic welfare losses on society. It 
will do by impeding access to existing 
information, or by increasing the wasteage of 
resources in functionally duplicative research 
aimed at avoiding patent licensing charges. 
This raises the cost not simply of research 
directed toward producing a specific new 
product(e.g., diagnostic test kits for a 
particular class of  genetically transmitted 
conditions), but, also of exploratory research 
that may enable the future creation of many 
applications, including those that still are 
undreamt of.  To use the evocative phrasing 
of a leading European scientist, cooperatively 
assembled bioinformatic databases are 
permitting researchers to make important 
discoveries in the course of ￿unplanned 
journeys through information space.￿ If that 
space becomes filled by a thicket of property 
rights, then those voyages of discovery will -1 7-
become more troublesome and more 
expensive to undertake, unanticipated 
discoveries will become less frequent, and the 
rate of expansion of the knowledge base is 
likely to slow. 
Popular wisdom maintains that ￿good fences 
make good neighbours￿. This may apply in 
the case of two farmers with adjacent fields ￿ 
one growing crops and the other grazing 
cattle ￿ or gold diggers excavating 
neighbouring concessions. But unlike land, 
forage or other kinds of exhaustible 
resources, knowledge is not depleted by use 
for consumption; data-sets are not subject to 
being ￿over-grazed￿, but instead are likely to 
be enriched and rendered more accurate the 
more that researchers are allowed to comb 
through them (David, 2001).   
    
The issues just examined are entangled with 
other, difficult problems concerning the 
institutional (as distinct from the 
technological) determinants of human beings 
ability to enhance their ￿capabilities￿ by 
finding and making use of existing 
repositories of knowledge and sources of 
information (Foray and Kazancigil, 1999). 
There are special problems of access to 
scientific and technological knowledge 
relevant to developing countries;
14 of what is 
means to maintain that every individual has a 
right to benefit from the collective advance 
of human knowledge affecting such 
fundamental, capability enhancing conditions 
as health and education.
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A delicate attempt at regaining a better 
balance between protection of the public 
domain of knowledge from further 
encroachments by the domain of private 
property rights, at least in regard to some 
sectors where services are recognised to 
profoundly effect human ￿well-being￿ 
(health, education). The notion of a universal 
right to health appears to have the ￿strength￿ 
to countervail against the national and 
international campaigns led by 
pharmaceutical companies to secure 
intellectual property owners the right to 
unregulated exploitation of their patents (cf. 
Cassier, this issue). But, one must not be 
deluded into supposing that appeals to 
principles of equity alone will be sufficient in 
deciding such contests in the area of political 
economy. 
 
5.4  New problems of trust? 
 
Fraudulent behaviour, forgery and pretence 
have obviously not been spawned all of a 
sudden by the virtual world. Questions 
concerning the original and the copy (Eco, 
1992), not to mention the evaluation of 
goods that are the object of commercial 
transactions, have given rise to the problem 
of trust and have highlighted how crucial 
trust-building mechanisms are to the 
functioning of markets and communities 
since the beginning of time. But the 
development of virtual relations has given the 
trust issue a new edge. What is at stake here is 
the entire range of mechanisms that will 
facilitate interpersonal and 
inter-organizational transactions, given the 
new conditions for knowledge transactions 
and exchanges: increasing specialization, 
increasingly asymmetrical distribution of 
information and assessment capabilities, 
ever-greater anonymity among interlocutors 
and ever-more opportunities for forgery of 
identity. Clearly, new methods need to be 
devised to ￿certify￿ the knowledge circulating 
on the Internet within a context where inputs 
are no longer subject to control (unlike the 
knowledge disseminated by scientific 
journals, for example, whose quality and 
reliability are validated through the peer 
review process). 
 
5.5  A society bereft of memory 
 
Today￿s younger generations might never 
experience the emotions aroused on 
rediscovering old toys or books in the attic 
and picking them up to find that they still 
work. Future machines may never be able to 
bring back to life the equivalent of our elders￿ 
wooden horses and toy soldiers: the 
playstation, earlier versions of which are 
already impossible to use on the latest 
computers. Our societies are confronted by 
an almost paradoxical situation whereby we 
have never before had such powerful storage 
and memorization technologies at our 
disposal, yet memory itself appears to be in -1 8-
danger. Two problems are beginning to 
emerge. 
 
First, with information technologies, we are 
not saving documents but sets of instructions 
that need to be interpreted and managed by 
the right hardware and software. So any lack 
of attention paid to the complementary 
components of a codified knowledge system 
(continuity of languages, keeping 
programmes that enable access to older files) 
runs the risk of irremediably altering society￿s 
overall memory. 
 
Second, given the exponential growth of all 
manner of documents, does it all really need 
to be kept? If not, then what does? On what 
medium (electronic, paper)? The unit costs of 
short-term storage and data retrieval may 
have fallen, but significant problems remain 
with respect to memorizing, filing and 
accessing old documents. The new electronic 
media for storage are not so stable, indeed, 
they are unstable in comparison with the 
low-sulfite rag paper on which good books 
have long been printed. Furthermore, the 
artifical languages used to encode 
information for computer processing also is 
comparatively less stable, in that it is more 
likely to suddenly become obsolete, requiring 
the corpus of stored information to be 
periodically ￿migrated￿ to a new code that 
new programs are able to read.  This has 
made ￿storage￿ of information in the digital 
age less a matter of archiving than a process 
of recurring renewal, a cultural task for which 
literate societies turns out not to be 
well-prepared.  
 
5.6  Fragmented knowledge: how can it 
be put back together again? 
 
There is a natural tendency for knowledge to 
fragment as it becomes subject to more 
in-depth division and dispersion. The 
division of knowledge stems from divisions 
of labour and increasing specialization. Its 
dispersion is the product of increasingly 
diffuse sources of innovation. The result is an 
extremely fragmented knowledge base, which 
makes it difficult to form a broad and 
integrated view of things. This can have 
disastrous consequences. At the level of 
global policy-making, knowledge that can 
help resolve a particular problem may exist 
without being ￿visible￿. It can go unnoticed 
by the decision-maker. Knowledge of the 
greenhouse effect, for instance, has been in 
the public domain since 1886 thanks to the 
study by Svente Arrenhuis, but failed to 
capture the attention of the political system 
for another hundred years. There is a big 
difference between the existence of 
knowledge in some place or the other and its 
availability to the right people in the right 
place at the right time. It amounts to a matter 
of knowing how to integrate and organize 
fragmented, scattered and thinly-spread 
knowledge.
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The famous economist, Alfred Marshall, 
raised basically the same question, albeit with 
respect to industrial activities: how can one 
organize and coordinate highly specialized 
activities within a context marked by an 
extreme social division of labour? The 
answer, according to Marshall, lay in two 
main factors: a reduction in transport costs 
and local concentrations of activity clusters, 
with each locality creating the right 
conditions for integrating knowledge 
(Loasby, 1989). 
 
So the whole question revolves around the 
capacity of the new information technologies 
to enable better integration of knowledge 
through helping bring down the cost of 
transporting it and paving the way for local 
concentrations of virtual activities. 
 
The new technologies, under certain 
conditions (see section 2) clearly do favour 
the low-cost transmission of knowledge and 
the creation of virtual communities. But the 
maintenance of human organizations in 
which incompletely codified knowledge 
resides poses a variety of socially and 
politically delicate challenges, involving the 
establishment of procedural authority to 
decide contested cognitive questions and 
stablize the knowledge held by the 
community, as well as to recruit new 
members and inculcate in them the 
cooperative mores that suppress destructive 
opportunistic behaviors (Steinmueller, 2001). 
Evidently, managing a social repository of -1 9-
knowledge is not the same thing as managing 
a library or an archive. Yet, much of the 
history of civilisation, from the dawn of 
literacy onwards, has focused attention and 
physical resources upon the evolutionary 
elaboration of archiving techniques and 
bought a corresponding waning of systematic 
commitment of investment in alternative 
modes of maintaining the continuity of 
memory in dynamic communities.  
 
That is not the only problem, however: some 
researchers, however, argue that the use of 
powerful communication technologies such 
as the Internet may promote uniformity to 
the detriment of diversity (Van Alstyne and 
Brynjolfsson, 1996). The time spent in 
on-line exchanges with members of one￿s 
own, pre-selected community leaves less time 
available for actual encounters with a 
wide-ranging variety of people: if a physicist 
is enabled to concentrate upon exchanging 
email and electronic pre-prints with other 
physicists around the world who are working 
in her specialized subject area ￿ as indeed 
researchers today generally are ￿ they are 
likely to devote less time, and be less 
receptive to new ways of looking at the world 
to which they would be exposed by chance 
meetings, and lunch-time conversations with 
colleagues who work in other disciplinary 
fields. Facilitating the voluntary construction 
of highly homogeneous social networks of 
scientific (or other, say, political) 
communication therefore allows individuals 
to filter the potentially overwhelming flow of 
information. But the result may be the 
tendency of over-filtering, which eliminates 
the diversity of knowledge and that circulates, 
and thus diminishes the frequency of radically 
new ideas. In this regard, even a journey 
through the stacks of a real library can be 
more fruitful than a trip through today￿s 
distributed virtual archives, because it seems 
difficult to use the available ￿search engines￿ 
to efficiently emulate the mixture of 
predictable and surprising discoveries that 
typically result from a physical shelf-search of 
an extensive library collection. New 
technologies are not automatically going to 
resolve the issue of knowledge integration. 
What really needs to be done is to establish 
and develop interdisciplinary communities 
made up of a heterogeneous range of 
members. In such cases, the sound 
￿Marshallian￿ properties of information 
technologies really can serve to support the 
integration of knowledge. 
 
6.  From the knowledge-based 
economy to the knowledge-based society 
 
The knowledge economy￿s growth into the 
knowledge society hinges on the proliferation 
of knowledge-intensive communities. These 
communities are basically linked to scientific, 
technical and some business professions or 
projects. As has been said, they are 
characterized by their strong knowledge 
production and reproduction capabilities, a 
public or semi-public space for learning and 
exchange and, the intensive use of 
information technologies. To function 
effectively, they must have overcome many, 
if not all of the challenges that this review has 
identified. Only when increasing numbers of 
communities displaying those very 
characteristics are formed across a wide array 
of cognitive fields, when professional 
experts, ordinary users of information, and 
uninitiated students are brought together by 
their shared interest in a given subject, will 
￿the knowledge society￿ become a reality 
rather than a vison of a possible future.  -2 0-
Notes 
 
1.  The French language offers a distinction 
between ￿savoir￿ and ￿connaissance￿ that has no 
real equivalent in English, though it can be 
conveyed by adding the qualifier ￿reliable￿. 
Reliable knowledge (￿savoir￿) means certified, 
robust knowledge that has been legitimized by 
some institutional mechanism (be it scientific 
peer review or collective memory and belief 
systems). Other forms of knowledge 
(￿connaissance￿) also enable action (knowing 
how to do the gardening, DIY) but have not been 
put through the same tests as certified knowledge. 
What separates the two has less to do with a 
contrast between the scientific and non-scientific 
than whether or not the knowledge has been 
subjected to institutional testing: ￿gardening 
knowledge￿ is reliable, wide-ranging and 
relatively decontextualized, but each gardener has 
his or her own local (and locality-specific) 
knowledge. Yet the knowledge-based economy 
does not preclude either form, meaning that it is 
not geared solely to the formal production of 
￿reliable knowledge￿. 
2.  The article by Hatchuel, et al., in the ￿The 
Knowledge Society,￿ a Special Issue of the 
International Social Science Journal, n. 171 
(February-March), 2002 [hereinafter, 
￿Knowledge Society￿ (2002)] provides useful 
insight into the new knowledge management 
methods used by companies within the context of 
￿intensive innovation-based capitalism￿. 
3.  The article by Rabeharisoa and Callon in 
￿Knowledge Society￿ (2002) is entirely devoted 
to this point. 
4.  This is an important distinction, the 
implications of which are examined in greater 
detail by Steinmueller, by Forero Pineda and 
Salazar, and by Hansson and Lam (all in 
￿Knowledge Society￿ (2002)) . 
5.  On the concept of ￿tacit knowledge￿ and 
its recent uses in economics, see Cowan, David 
and Foray (2000), and other contributions 
accompanying this article in the same special issue 
of  Industrial and Corporate Change, 9(2), 
Guest-edited by P. Cohendet and W. E. 
Steinmueller.  
6.  The concept of public (or semi-public) 
spaces for knowledge circulation is complex. 
Such spaces can include areas in which exclusive 
property rights cannot be granted, either 
￿constitutionally￿ (as in the case of open science) 
or within the framework of organizations 
especially designed for the purpose (research 
networks and consortia where partners share 
their knowledge) and markets whose modi 
operandi are conducive to efficient knowledge 
dissemination (see the articles by Cassier,  and by 
Arora, et al. in ￿Knowledge Society￿ (2002)). 
7.  This can happen when too much 
importance is attached to the latest information 
or too little attention is devoted to the size of 
sample selected to assess information. Another 
good example is be the familiarity heuristic (cf. 
Favereau, 1998). 
8.  See the article by Lam (in ￿Knowledge 
Society￿ (2002) ) on the comparative analysis of 
the societal organizations underpinning the 
development of skills in the knowledge-based 
economy . 
9.  Some 65% of industrial workers in France 
were already working away from home by 1906 
(Mokyr, 2000). 
10.  This point is more fully discussed by 
Feldman in ￿Knowledge Society￿ (2002). 
11.  On large scale facilities for scientific 
research, the potentialities of electronic data 
networks, and international cooperation in 
￿megascience￿ projects, see, e.g., Irvine (1997), 
esp. Chs. 28, 30. 
12.  Some authors call for the deployment of 
knowledge networks that involve the return of 
scientists and engineers (e.g. from California to 
Taiwan or certain parts of India). According to 
this ￿brain circulation￿ model, the latter return 
home highly trained and imbued with the 
entrepreneurial spirit of Silicon Valley. But it 
gives rise to other such problems as the isolation 
of the scientific elite from the rest of the 
population and the propagation of a single 
socio-economic model (Saxenian, 2001). 
13.  See the article by Forero Pineda and 
Salazar in ￿Knowledge Society￿ (2002). 
14.  See the articles in ￿Knowledge Society￿ 
(2002) by: Forero Pineda and Salazar; Sarmiento 
and Forero Pineda; and Arora, et al. 
15.  See the article by Cassier in ￿Knowledge 
Society￿ (2002). 
16.  See the article by Hansson (in ￿Knowledge 
Society￿ (2002) ) on integrated knowledge within 
the context of public debate and decision-making 
processes.  -2 1-
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